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LABOR LAW
Disabled Employees Versus Reluctant Employers:
Who Wins When the Evidence Is Equal?
by Jay E. Grenig
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs, United States Department of Labor
V.
Greenwich Collieries
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
United States Department of Labor
V.
Maher Terminals, Inc.
(Docket No. 93-744)
Argument Date: April 25, 1994
From: The Third Circuit
ISSUE
Does the use of the "true doubt"
rule in adjudicating claims for bene-
fits under the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act and the
Black Lung Benefits Act contravene
regulations of the Department of
Labor and Section 7(c) of the
Administrative Procedure Act?
FACTS
In Greenwich Collieries, Andrew
Ondecko had worked as a coal miner
for 31 years before applying for dis-
ability benefits under the Black Lung
Benefits Act (the "BLBA"). 30
U.S.C. §§ 901-45. When his applica-
tion was denied, Ondecko requested a
hearing before an administrative law
judge.
Examining conflicting expert testi-
mony, the Administrative Law Judge
(the "A.L.J.") concluded that the fact that at least one expert
had repeatedly found evidence of pneumoconiosis was signif-
icant enough to raise true doubt on the issue of the existence
of the disease, notwithstanding expert interpretations finding
no evidence of the lung disease. Holding that the true doubt
Jay E. Grenig, professor of law, Marquette University Law
School, 1103 West Wisconsin Avenue, Milwaukee, W1 53233;
(414) 288-5377.
rule resolves all doubt in favor of the claimant when the evi-
dence of the opposing parties is of equal weight, the A.L.J.
found that Ondecko had established the existence of pneumo-
coniosis and awarded benefits.
Greenwich Collieries appealed to the Department of
Labor's Benefits Review Board (the "Board") which
affirmed. The Board concluded that the A.L.J. had "properly
discussed and weighed all relevant medical evidence" on the
pneumoconiosis issue and that, because she "found the posi-
tive and negative interpretations by [expert] physicians... to
be equally probative," she had properly resolved the question
in Ondecko's favor under the true doubt rule.
Greenwich Collieries then appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Vacating the Board's
decision, the court of appeals held that Ondecko was required
to prove the existence of pneumoconiosis by a preponderance
of the evidence. Greenwich Collieries v. Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs,
990 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1993).
In reaching this decision, the Third
Circuit construed Section 718 of the
injured workers are Department of Labor's regulations
nefits under the under the BLBA, 20 C.F.R. §718.40,
Harbor Workers' which provides that "the burden of
nd the Black Lung proving a fact.., rests with the party
partment of Labor making such allegations," as allocat-
idence called the ing to the claimant the burden of per-
iich provides that, suasion as to his or her disability.
evidence and the (The "burden of persuasion" refers to
rty opposing the the degree of proof required to sup-
aubt is resolved in port a particular fact. Proof by a "pre-
Now the Supreme ponderance of the evidence" is the
termine if the true lowest degree of proof in the law and
s the Department's is the degree of proof most often
Administrative applied in administrative hearings.)
The Third Circuit also relied on
Section 7(c) of the Administrative
Procedure Act (the "APA"), 5 U.S.C.
§ 556(d), which provides that the proponent of an order has the
burden of proof and that an order may not be issued unless it is
supported by "reliable, probative, and substantial evidence."
In the Maher Terminals case, Michael Santoro sustained a
work-related back injury on July 23, 1985. Despite treatment,
he experienced increasing pain and numbness. By August 15,
he was unable to get out of bed and was hospitalized.
An examining physician at the hospital observed spinal
cord swelling and irregularity; a neurbsurgeon suspected a
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tumor in the spinal cord. Surgery disclosed that Santoro,
indeed, had a tumor, identified as an astrocytoma, a rare form
of nerve cancer. Santoro died in March 1986 from cardiac
arrest caused by the cancerous tumor.
Santoro's widow filed a claim under the Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (the "LHWCA"), 33
U.S.C. §§ 901-45, claiming that the July 1985 injury had ren-
dered her husband totally disabled and had caused his death.
The A.L.J. found the evidence of causation evenly balanced
and invoked the true doubt rule, awarding benefits to Mrs.
Santoro.
The Board affirmed, holding that the true doubt rule is well
established under the LHWCA. The Board found no error in
the A.L.J.'s analysis or his application of the true doubt rule
and, accordingly, also affirmed the award of benefits.
On appeal to United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, the same three-judge panel that had vacated the
Board's decision in the Greenwich Collieries case also vacat-
ed the Board's decision in the Maher Terminals case, rejecting
the true doubt rule. Maher Terminals, Inc. v. Director, Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs, 992 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir.
1993).
The Third Circuit went on to hold that Section 7(c) of the
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d), specifies the level of proof that must
be met by the party bearing the burden of persuasion on a par-
ticular issue and went on to hold that proof by a preponderance
of the evidence is the required level of proof under the
LHWCA. Finally, the court held that Section 7(c) affirmative-
ly allocates the burden of persuasion to the party seeking ben-
efits under the LHWCA, i.e., to the injured worker or claimant.
Because the true doubt rule allows a claimant to prevail when
the evidence is in equipoise, the court concluded that the rule's
application violates Section 7(c) of the APA.
The Supreme Court granted petitions for certiorari filed by
the Department of Labor in both of these cases to review the
Third Circuit's holdings with respect to the true doubt rule.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The LHWCA provides a workers' compensation system for
longshore workers and other persons engaged in maritime
employment on navigable waters. Similarly, the BLBA pro-
vides a compensation system for miners, if (1) the miner is
totally disabled; (2) the disability was caused, at least in part,
by pneumoconiosis; and (3) the disability arose out of coal
mine employment. When the BLBA was enacted in 1969, it
incorporated many provisions of the LHWCA, including its
procedures for processing and adjudicating claims.
The Department of Labor (the "DOL") has applied the true
doubt rule for many years in resolving benefits claims under
the LHWCA. Courts of appeals in the First, Fifth, Seventh,
Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits have upheld decisions
utilizing the true doubt rule under the LHWCA. See, e.g., Bath
Iron Works Corp. v. White, 584 F.2d 569 (1st Cir. 1978);
Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. Kennel, 914 F.2d 88 (5th Cir.
1990); Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. OWCP, 988 F.2d
706 (7th Cir. 1993), petition for cert. pending; Parsons Corp.
v. Director, OWCP, 619 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1980); Fidelity &
Casualty Co. v. Burris, 59 F.2d. 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
Pointing out that the purpose of all workers' compensation
laws is to provide injured employees with security, the court in
Burris explained that evidentiary doubt should be resolved in
favor of the injured employee or the employee's dependent
family.
In Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135
(1987), the Supreme Court stated that another DOL regulation,
20 C.F.R. § 727.203, required a claimant to invoke a presump-
tion of eligibility by establishing one of several predicate facts
by a preponderance of the evidence. However, in discussing
the employer's burden under the same regulation, the Court
noted that the use of the true doubt rule ensures that the
employer will win only when its evidence is stronger than the
claimant's. The Court, however, did not consider directly the
validity of either the true doubt rule or the DOL's regulations
at issue in these cases.
Section 19(d) of the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 919(d), requires
that any hearing held under the LHWCA must be conducted in
accordance with the APA. The first sentence of Section 7(c) of
the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d), provides that, "[e]xcept as other-
wise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order has
the burden of proof." In NLRB v. Transportation Management
Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983), the Supreme Court commented
that the first sentence of Section 7(c) determines only the bur-
den of offering evidence, not the burden of persuasion.
Two years later, in considering the third sentence of Section
7(c), which provides that an order may not be issued unless
supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, the
Court stated that the language of Section 7(c) implies a bur-
den of persuasion and that the appropriate burden of persua-
sion is the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981). However, neither
Transportation Management nor Steadman directly
addressed the applicability of the true doubt rule.
The Supreme Court's decision in these two cases will have
important consequences in future cases under the BLBA and
the LHWCA. If it invalidates the true doubt rule, injured
employees will have more difficulty in establishing their
rights to benefits under the acts. On the other hand, if the
Court upholds the true doubt rule, it will be more difficult for
employers to defend against claims under these two acts.
ARGUMENTS
For the Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs, United States Department of Labor (Counsel of
Record: Drew S. Days, III, Solicitor General, Department of
Justice, Washington, DC 20530; (202) 514-2217):
1. The true doubt rule is a reasonable implementation of the
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act and
the Black Lung Benefits Act.
2. Application of the true doubt rule is a long-standing and
reasonable implementation of the Longshore and Harbor
Issue No. 7
Workers' Compensation Act and furthers the policies
underlying the Act.
3. Application of the true doubt rule is an appropriate imple-
mentation of the Black Lung Benefits Act and rests, in part,
on a reasonable interpretation of the Secretary of Labor's
own regulations under that Act.
4. The true doubt rule does not contravene Section 7(c) of the
Administrative Procedure Act.
For Greenwich Collieries (Counsel of Record: John J.
Bagnato; Spence, Custer, Saylor, Wolfe & Rose, U.S.
National Bank Building, P.O. Box 280, Johnstown, PA
15907; (814) 536-0735) and for Maher Terminals, Inc.
(Counsel of Record, Joseph T. Stearns; Kenny & Stearns, 26
Broadway, New York, NY 10004-1882; (212) 422-6111):
1. The Administrative Procedure Act does not contemplate
the allocation of burdens or standards of proof with an eye
toward the identity of the party the proof favors.
2. The Administrative Procedure Act was designed to ensure
a level playing field, maximize the independence of the
adjudicator, and guarantee the fairness of the basic rules
insulating both from the ebb and flow of agency policies
and politics.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Greenwich Collieries and Maher Terminals,
Inc.
American Insurance Association (Counsel of Record:
William J. Kilberg; Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, 1050
Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036; (202)
955-8500);
Joint brief of the National Association of Waterfront
Employers and four others (Counsel of Record; Charles T.
Carroll, Jr., 2011 Eye Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006;
(202) 296-3005);
National Coal Association (Counsel of Record; Harold P.
Quinn, Jr., National Coal Assocation, 1130 17th Street, NW,
Washington, DC 20036; (202) 463-2652).
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